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Just Satisfaction under the Convention 
Is There a Southern Dimension?* 
Giovanni Bonello, Judge of the European Court of Human Rights 
Introduction 
When the European Court of Human Rights finds a violation 
of any protected right, the Convention relies on 'just satis­
faction' to re-establish the equilibrium disturbed by the nation­
al authorities through the agency of that violation. The Court, 
mindful of its supranational character and desirous to intrude 
as minimally as possible in the sphere of national sovereign­
ty, has deliberately imposed on itself a self-discipline that is 
mostly manifest in how far it will go in ordering the offend­
ing state to redress the wrong inflicted 
From its early days the Court determined never to order 
violating states any acts of specific performance, but to limit 
itself to a declaratory judgement that the Convention has been 
violated, followed occasionally, but not always, by an order 
to the state to pay a sum of money to the victim by way of 
compensation. The Court does not declare laws or adminis­
trative acts which it finds in breach of the Convention to be 
null, nor does it enjoin a restitutio in integrum, even in cases 
where this would be factually possible. In the final analysis, 
the applicant can at best, expect a certificate of having been 
a victim of a human rights abuse, and a payment of a sum of 
money to cover real damages, moral damages and reimburse­
ment of costs. 
The process by which the offending law, and the admin­
istrative action or inaction are rectified in the domestic arena 
are no direct concern of the Court. A political process, entrust­
ed to the workings and monitoring of the Committee of Min­
isters of the Council of Europe, sees to that. 
It is hardly short of a platitude that, by their very nature, 
human rights are the common heritage of all mankind. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1948) starts by re­
ferring to the 'equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family' as the foundation offreedom,justice and 
peace in the world. And the European Convention of Human 
Rights aims at securing to 'everyone' within the jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms listed therein. 
In theory it would amount to an offensive contradiction in 
terms to speak of a southern or northern perspective of human 
rights. Objectively, the moment the Court acknowledged that 
a western perception or enforcement of human rights can be 
different from an eastern one, or that different criteria should 
govern the application of human rights depending on which 
geographical area is at issue, the whole philosophical fabric 
of human rights would be nullified. The values enshrined in 
Art. 14 of the Convention that, in the enjoyment of fundamen­
tal rights any discrimination based on race, colour or nation­
al origin is impermissible, would be infringed, and not by 
some rogue state, but by the Court itself. In fact, one of the 
unwritten functions of the Court I perceive to be the harmo­
nization of the enforcement of the Convention throughout all 
member states, aiming at a substantial, rather than a fictitious, 
uniformity in the application of the Convention. 
Judge Rozakis's intervention focused on how the Court 
attempts to face the challenges posed by the occasionally 
huge differences that exist between Convention states in mat­
ters, among others, of cultural sensibilities, historical tradi­
tions, religious beliefs, national economic wealth, and con­
flicting legal systems. It is well to launch any discussion as­
serting the universal primacy of human rights, and that they 
should be enjoyed even-handedly across the continents; the 
Convention protects Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
from the polar regions to the south Mediterranean. 
The Court will always keep in mind as a long term objec­
tive a homogeneous interpretation and enforcement of the 
Convention throughout the whole of Europe; but it would 
be slow, at the same time, to ride roughshod over sensitive 
issues by imposing its own world-views when these jar stri­
dently with deeply-felt sectional convictions and aspirations. 
It is easy to feel gcxx:l about the international bonding brought 
about by a common human rights practice. But how is the 
Court to cope with single issues that, at the present stage of 
European fragmentation, evoke the most diverse evaluations 
in different societies? Take abortion, an issue which spans 
the whole gamut of legal experience. Abortion, a universally 
controversial subject, ranges from a protected fundamental 
right in the USA, to a decriminalized practice in many Con-
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vention states, to a criminal offence in some others, like Ire­
land and Malta. You cannot have a wider spectrum than that. 
In the name of standardization, how would the Court deal 
with such temperamentally-charged issues? 
My remit is to explore if the profound divergences under­
lying European thought, often reflected in conflictual values, 
have left a.n imprint in the application of Art. 41 (formerly 
Art. 50) which deals with just satisfaction. Can it be said that 
the Court's case-law evidences different criteria, attributable 
either to the victim's or to the violating state's geographical 
identity? Are there a first and a second Europe? We have to 
keep in mind that the Court is the sum-total of 41 individ­
ual judges, of whom 31 are from the north and central Eu­
rope, 24 from the older democracies and 17 from the newer 
ones. They sit in delicately calibrated formations which strive 
towards a fair balance between all the different personal back­
grounds. However, except for Judge Rozakis, from Greece, 
Senior Vice-President, all the other seven officials of the 
Court come from the old democracies from north and cen­
tral Europe. 
How Others See Us 
Let me say from the outset that I consider the European 
Convention and the European Court of Human Rights to be 
the greatest single contribution to the assertion of human 
rights, in the whole span of history. Their success has been 
astounding, their benefits bountiful, their achievements in­
spiring. Any criticism I may make or borrow from human 
rights literature should always be perceived keeping in mind 
the unqualified respect I have for this hallowed institution. 
Every giant has its Achilles's heel. The Court, in my view, 
has Articles 6 and 41. 
In fact these are two areas in the Court's case-law that, 
more than any other, have attracted consistent and widespread 
criticism in legal circles: its unsteady, and perhaps irrational 
waverings as to which 'civil rights and obligations' attract 
the guarantees of Article 6 (fair hearing) together with the 
wayward manner in which 'just satisfaction' is awarded or 
denied, and the methods used to asses it. This bane has per­
plexed the Court since its earliest days. 
Criticisms against the way Strasburg awards 'just satis­
faction' after a finding of a violation have received what is 
possibly the most damning expression in the very recent re­
port by the English and Scottish Law Commission on dam­
ages under the Human Rights Act, 1998 . 1 It would not be 
practicable to summarize here that voluminous report; one 
CM 4853, October 2000. 
can only try to reproduce its main heads. 
The report opens by referring to the 'Absence of clear prin­
ciples in the Strasburg case-law' as to when damages should 
be awarded and how they should be measured. This lack of 
transparency and coherence is attributed to various reasons, 
among which is the fact that the Court does not, differently 
from British courts, apply a strict doctrine of precedent: 'ap­
parently irreconcilable inconsistencies sometimes result'. The 
fact is that within Europe there are very diverse traditions as 
to the calculation of compensation. While the UK, German 
and Dutch systems have detailed rules governing the assess­
ment of damages, other systems proceed empirically 'swayed 
by considerations of fairness' which give the judge a degree of 
'unstructured discretion to adjust the award as he or she deems 
fit'. 
Another reason for the lack of clear and precise rules as 
to the award and the liquidation of damages stems from the 
fact that the Court is an international tribunal, that has to di­
gest a heavy mix of legal systems, always careful to strike 
a viable balance 'between exercising moral leadership in the 
field of human rights law' and, at the same time, 'ensuring 
that it does not. .. alienate the support for the European Court 
of Human Rights in particular states'. Judges are drawn from 
different backgrounds and diverse jurisdictions, and have 
varied experiences in awarding damages. Inevitably their 
views as to the proper levels of compensation will differ, 
sometimes very widely. When it comes to moral damages, 
in Strasburg quaintly called non-pecuniary damages, their 
assessment, as Lord Camwath observed, is inevitably 'some­
thing of a jury exercise'. That was not meant as a compliment. 
A jurist, recently summarized the position thus: 'It is rare 
to find a reasoned decision articulating principles on which 
a remedy is afforded. One former judge of the ECHR private­
ly states 'We have no principles' .Another judge responds 'we 
have principles; we just do not apply them" .2 
Two other commentators warned against wasting time 
attempting to identify principles that do not exist.3 This is 
echoed by other authorities, who commiserate with domes­
tic courts 'largely frustrated in their search for principles' .4 
The English and Scottish report singles out my dissenting 
opinion in Niko/ova v. Bulgaria5 for 'the vigour of the lan­
guage' by which I distanced myself from the Court's failure 
to give any reasons why it refused to grant damages after find­
ing a violation of fundamental rights. The report concludes, 
that 'the Strasburg Court's explanations of its awards for 
just satisfaction are often perfunctory or non-existent' 
I 
2 
3 
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5 
Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2000, p. 1. 
Lester & Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice, 1999, para. 2.8.4. 
12 
Grosz, Beaston, and Duffy, The 1998 Act and the European Convention, 2000, para. 6.21. 
25 March 1999. 
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'The inconsistencies of the Court's jurisprudence on Ar­
ticle 41 make it extremely difficult, even for informed legal 
advisers to manage their expectations [those of prospective 
litigants] by being able to advise with confidence on the pos­
sible outcome' .6
Offensive as it may sound, Jean-Fran9ois Flauss recently 
described the liquidation of damages by the Strasburg Court 
as, at best, empirical, a sort of do-it-yourself (bricolage).7 
One of the major ideals of the Court - of any court really 
- is the attainment of legal certainty. In this particular field of
just satisfaction, none currently exists. Rights are not automat­
ically armed with remedies. Remedies often have the trappings
of princely largess. Lord Devlin famously said 'The discretion
of the judge is the first instrument of tyranny' . 8 I do not know
whether it is the first. It certainly is not a pleasant one.
Reimbursements of Costs 
This is one of the provinces of just satisfaction in which the un­
fettered discretion of the Court manifests itself most. The idio­
syncrasies and the weaknesses, of the system speak out loudly. 
Costs of legal proceedings fall naturally into two catego­
ries - those costs incurred in the domestic jurisdiction, and 
those incurred in the Strasburg organs. While the first present 
no major difficulties, the second are fraught with surprises 
and underscore dramatically a north/south divide. 
Legal Costs in the Domestic Jurisdiction 
As the Convention makes it imperative that the applicant 
should have exhausted unsuccessfully all domestic remedies, 
it is normal that the applicant, before foiwarding his complaint 
to Strasburg, would have incurred costs and expenses. It is 
only in exceptional cases when no form of remedy is avail­
able in the domestic jurisdiction that the applicant's legal costs 
start in the Strasburg Court. Of course, the fact that the domes­
tic system offers no internal remedy to redress the alleged 
violation, in itself constitutes an autonomous breach of the 
Convention, which requires that every fundamental right 
should be fortified by a remedy in case of breach (Art. 13). 
As for domestic legal costs whose reimbursement is claimed 
by the applicant, the Court will only check that they were 'ac­
tually and necessarily incurred' and were 'reasonable as to 
quantum' .9 Costs will be considered necessary if they were 
incurred by the applicant to prevent or to redress the breach 
identified by the Court. 10 The Court usually allows all the 
costs of the domestic jurisdiction which have not been dis-
6 Liberty's pleadings in Kingsley v. UK, pending. 
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puted by the government, even when they are higher than 
the legal costs current in other Convention states. In general 
the Court allows in favour of the applicant, fees and costs in 
line with domestic scales and practices. 
Legal Costs in the Strasburg Jurisdiction 
Here we are squarely within the Strasburg minefield where 
huge discrepancies in the taxing of legal costs and fees can 
be identified. In principle - though subject to various excep­
tions - I believe it is fair to say that some northern law prac­
tices fare infinitely better than southern ones. 
The underlying, though silent principle seems to be that 
the Court will award lawyers appearing in Strasburg a fee 
comparable to that due when appearing before the highest 
court of the respondent state, occasionally with a bonus for 
such extras as whether a hearing was held or not, how com­
plex the case was, the necessity of more than one lawyer and 
the number of violations found. 
Having said that, I believe that it is safe to claim that the 
Court often awards fortunes in favour of northern lawyers, 
when, in substantially similar cases, their southern colleagues 
are awarded risible amounts. 
The first Maltese case in Strasburg, Demicoli v. Malta11 
came up for hearing at virtually the same time as The Observ­
er and The Sunday Times applications against the UK. At 
issue in all these cases were serious matters affecting free­
dom of the press and the right to a fair trial. In the Maltese 
case the Court was called upon, in addition, to overturn a for­
mal resolution passed by Parliament and a judgement of the 
Constitutional Court. As the common-law institute of breach 
of parliamentary privilege was at stake, the judgement in the 
Maltese case was bound to reverberate in the UK and Ire­
land, where identical systems were in place. The Court decid­
ed the applications within a few weeks of each other. For five 
levels of jurisdiction it awarded the Maltese lawyers a fee of 
LMS,000.00 (from which LMI ,800.00 travelling expenses 
had to be deducted) and the English lawyers a cumulative 
fee of £200,000. 
The trend of awarding high fees to some UK lawyers, 
and denying the same fees to southern ones, started very early 
on. In 1962, in the UK case of Young, James and Webster re­
garding the dismissal of workers who failed to join closed­
shop trade unions, the costs of the British lawyers were as­
sessed at £65,000.12 Since then, the Court has rarely let British
lawyers down. 
7 
8 
9 
'La reparation due en cas de violation de CEDH', in Journal des tribunaux droit Europeen, 1996, No. 25, p. 15. 
Report of the Committee on Evidence in Identification, HMSO, London, 1976. 
IO 
Minelli v. Switzerland, 25 March 1983, A 62. 
Scozzari & Giunta v. Italy, 3 July 2000, § 257. 
II 27 August 1991,A. 210. 
12 18 October 1982,A 55,p. 8. 
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I will not bore you with details, and acknowledge that it 
is often difficult to be sure that one is comparing like with 
like. But a few examples may be enlightening. 
Selmouni v. France was a watershed case, in which the 
Court redesigned its thinking about torture. The costs award­
ed to the French legal team were c. 113,000 FF.13 In Aydin v.
Turkey, a rather more 'routine' torture case, the British de­
fence lawyers were awarded 300% more - 340,000 FF. 14 In 
two Right to Life cases (Art. 2), the Turkish lawyer in the Ogur 
case got the equivalent of £3,000 15 while the British lawyer 
in the Caciki case got £20,000.16 
Even more obvious were the cases of Gregoriades v.
Greece 17 and Bowman v. UK,18 bothArt.10 violations. In the 
Greek case t�e legal fees were c. 15,000 FF. In the British 
case, c. 250,000 FF - over fifteen times more. 
Compare also two cases in which the central issue was 
unlawful telephone tapping: Halford v. UK19 and Kruslin v.
France .20 In the French case the French lawyers' fees were 
taxed at 20,000 FF. A minimal award, compared with the UK 
case, in which the British lawyers were awarded 250,000 FF. 
Two further examples to illuminate this subject. The Court 
quite often refuses to award damages, declaring that the find­
ing of a violation shall, in itself, constitute just satisfaction. 
This finding of violation, doubling also as compensation, is 
presumably made when the Court, from the moral high ground 
on which it sits, would find it uncomfortable to reward with 
a prize a particularly undeserving applicant. I say presum­
ably, because very rarely, if ever, does the Court explain why 
it reaches this conclusion. However, two British cases in 
which the Court refused to go further than merely finding a 
violation and in which it rejected the claims for material 
and moral damages, all the same rewarded the lawyers with 
fees of £35,0002 1 and £45,00022 respectively. 
The high legal fees taxed in favour of northern lawyers 
defending applicants against southern states, bring about an­
other unsavoury bye-product -the lawyer often ends up get­
ting more than the victim he or she has defended. The rela­
tives of Mahmet Kaya who disappeared - presumably killed 
13 28 July 1999. 
14 24 September 1997. 
15 Ogur v. Turkey, 20 May 1999. 
16 (:akici v. Turkey, 8 July 1999. 
17 Rec. 1997-V II, No. 57. 
18 Rec. 1998-1, No. 63. 
19 Rec. 1997-111, No. 39. 
20 A 176-A. 
21 
D. v. UK, Rec. 1999-111, No. 39.
22 
Chahal v. UK, Rec. 1996-V, No. 22.
23 Mahmet Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000.
24 Aydin v. Turkey, 25 September 1997.
25 
2 October 2001.
14 
-during police custody, got £17,500, while their British lawyers
got £22,000.23 Mrs Sukran Aydin, who was raped and sav­
aged by the security forces, was fortunate to get £25,000,
but her British lawyers were more fortunate still; they got
£34,360.24 Lest you think there is an element of racial dis­
crimination, let me refer you to the recent case of Hatton
and seven others v. UK which dealt with the high level of
noise round Heathrow airport at night. Each of the victims
was compensated with £4,000, but the Court awarded the
victims' lawyers a fee of £70,000.25 I, for one, find myself
quite uncomfortable with a situation in which the pain and
suffering of the close relatives of a person assassinated by
security forces during detention, are valued less then the ex­
ertions of a lawyer on their behalf.
Of course, it is quite easy to reduce these issues to ex­
ercises in bewilderment. The reality, however, is much more 
complex than that. Fees charges by northern lawyers in do­
mestic litigation, as compared to those of their southern col­
leagues, are, in general, substantially higher. They usually 
relate to current levels of income in each particular country. 
Lawyers who habitually charge 'northern' fees will be unwill­
ing to act in Strasburg for less. This places the Court in a dilem­
ma. Must it tell the applicants to scout around for the cheap­
est lawyer on the market because the court will not sanction 
the reimbursement of a high fee? Can it tell an applicant in 
a Greek case not to engage an English lawyer? What happens 
if the Court awards a British lawyer a 'Greek' fee? The prob­
lem, in my view, appears quite insurmountable. If the Court 
awarded British lawyers 'Maltese' fees, they would obvious­
ly desert the Strasburg venue. If it awards Maltese lawyers, in 
cases against the Maltese state, 'British' fees, it would disturb 
profoundly the social, political and financial realities of the 
Maltese economy. 
Now, while I recognize the objective difficulties that un­
derlie the north/south divide in the matter of legal fees taxed 
by the Court, I nonetheless find other related situations quite 
unexplainable. To the best of my knowledge, two cases are 
on record in which the applicants were professional lawyers 
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who chose to defend themselves in Strasburg proceedings: 
Dr Joe Brincat who successfully sued Italy26 and Dr K. F. 
who sued Germany.27 They both claimed lawyer's fees for
conducting their own defence. The Court rejected Dr Brin­
cat's claim for professional fees, but granted Dr K. F.'s, tax­
ing 10,000 DM in his favour. Both cases related to unlaw­
ful detention. The German lawyer complained of being de­
prived of his liberty for 45 minutes over the statutory period 
allowed to the police. Dr Brincat's claim, also endorsed by 
the Court, related, not to an illegal detention of 45 minutes, 
but in excess of three weeks. 
The problem has no easy short-term solution. Perhaps it 
is too early, in view of the dramatic discrepancies between 
the economies of the various Convention states, to aspire to 
anything like a common European scale. 
Non-Pecuniary Loss 
This is another area in which grave contradictions, incon­
sistencies and obscurities arise. Having established a viola­
tion, the Court faces the dilemma of whether to grant moral 
damages or not, and, if so, to what extent. 
The case-law of the Court has had various occasions to 
subdivide the diverse heads under which moral damages may 
be granted. In general it is safe to say that ideally they should 
constitute a restitutio in integrum for physical and mental 
suffering resulting from a violation of Convention rights. 
Compensation has been, and may be, awarded in case the 
violation found has caused anxiety28 inconvenience29 frus­
tration30 loss of reputation3 1 loss of family relationship32 feel­
ing of injustice,33 sensation of isolation, confusion and ne­
glect34 and psychological harm.35
The Court has, on principle, also accepted that 'by reason 
of its very nature, non-pecuniary damage of the kind alleged 
26 
26 November 1992,A 249-A. 
27 27 November 1997, Rec. 1997-VII.
28 
Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 1995, A 2, p. 277.
29 
Olson v. Switzerland, No. 2, 1994,A 17 p. 134. 
30 
Van der Leer v. Netherlands, 1990, A 12, p. 267.
31 
Salik v. Turkey, 1998, 26, p. 662. 
32 
H. V. UK, 1998 A 136-B.
33 
Ringeisen v. Germany, 22 June 1972,A 15.
34 
Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980 A 37, §. 47.
35 
Aydin v. Turkey, 25 September 1997, § 131. 
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cannot always be the object of concrete proof. However it 
is reasonable to assume that persons ... may suffer distress 
and anxiety' .36 It is difficult to comprehend why this very 
useful and reasonable presumption of suffering has some­
times been relied on, but more often not. 
The overriding principle seems to be that both the award 
and the extent of compensation for moral damages stem from 
the virtually absolute discretionary powers of the Court. The 
other side of the coin is that awards quite often have no ver­
ifiable foundation other than 'an equitable basis' .37
The exercise of the Court's discretionary powers in the 
granting or not of moral damages brings about a situation of 
uncertainty, and maybe arbitrariness. In what seem to be very 
similar circumstances, the Court awards moral damages in 
one case and denies them in another. Some examples, limit­
ed to Art. 5 (freedom from unlawful detention) will suffice: 
When the Court found detention to be in breach of Art. 
5 § 1, moral damages were awarded in Van der Leer v. Nether­
lands38 and denied in Ciulla v. Italy .39
In applications in which the breach consisted in failing 
to bring the detained person promptly before a judicial au­
thority (Art. 5 §3), moral damages were awarded in some 
cases40 but denied in others.4 1
In cases where the Court held that domestic proceedings 
for reviewing the lawfulness of the detention had been defec­
tive or failed the test of promptness, (Art. 5 §4) compensation 
was withheld in some cases 42 and liquidated in others .43 
The Court's finding that the domestic system did not have 
in place a remedy to test the legality of detention (Art. 5 §4) 
was followed by an award of moral damages in some cases 44 
but not in others.45
It is difficult to reconcile the reasonings behind the award 
of moral damages for illegal detention. In a French case, in 
36 
Abdullaziz, Cabales, Balkandali v. UK, 1985,A 94, p. 96.
37 
Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1990, A 39, § 114; Silver et v. UK, 24 October 1983, A 67, § 9.
38 
A 170, 21 February 1990.
39 
A 148, 22 February 1998. 
40 Huber v. Switzerland,A 188, 23 October 1990.
41 Duinhof & Duijf v. Netherlands, A 79, 22 May 197 4. 
42 Koendjbiharje v. Netherlands, A 185, 25 October 1990. 
43 
De Jong et v. Netherlands, A 77, 22 May 1984. 
44 Weeks v. UK,A 14, 5 October 1988. 
45 Thynne, Wilson & Gunnell,A 190, 25 October 1990. 
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which the deprivation of liberty lasted eleven hours, the amount 
granted the victim was 60,000 FF in all (c. LM360.00 per 
hour).46 In the Maltese case T.W v. Malta, the Court also found
that the applicant's detention had been illegal, but awarded the 
applicant no moral damages at all, though in this case the 
unlawful detention lasted nineteen days, not eleven hours.47
This litany could go on almost endlessly. When the breach 
consisted in the lack of access to a court, Strasburg occasion­
ally grants compensation,48 and occasionally refuses it.49 If
certainty of the law is a fundamental value to which each legal 
system should aspire, it is a value that occasionally tends to be 
glaringly absent. Even when the violation consists in undue 
delay in terminating civil disputes where the issues are gener­
ally quite straightforward, surprises are never absent. On the 
same day the Court gave two judgements in length of proceed­
ings cases regarding deaths in car accidents. In Casciaroli v. 
Italy it awarded Lit 60,000,00050 while in Tusa v. Italy, it only
awarded Lit. 10,000,000, though the proceedings had last­
ed two years longer.51 Today, it must be said, the sums award­
ed appear more standardized. 
While the Court can be quite ungenerous with awards of 
moral damages, a swing in the opposite direction can some­
times be detected in some 'length of civil proceedings' cases. 
In an application regarding the eviction of an 'illegal' tenant 
in which the court proceedings lasted almost fourteen years, 
the Court awarded the illegal tenant moral damages for the 
delay-although he had clearly benefited from that delay, both 
by hanging on to his illegal occupation of his residence for may 
years, and by not paying any rent in the very long interval .52 
Coming closer to the southern dimension, I would ex­
clude outright any overt or covert determination to treat dif­
ferently similar cases which arise in different geographical 
areas. The problem, in my view, is neither racial, ethnic or 
geopolitical. It is part of the general inability, in the partic­
ular province of just satisfaction, to fix clear standards and 
abide by them. The Court candidly admitted the inconsisten­
cies in its approach to moral damages in Niko/ova v. Bulgar­
ia.53 Steps have been taken internally to overview these prob­
lems and seek solutions. 
46 Quinn v. France, 22 March 1995, A 311. 
47 19April 1999. 
48 
Skarby v. Sweden,A 180, 28 June 1990. 
49 
Boden v. Sweden, A 125, 27 October 1987. 
50 27 February 1992. 
51 
27 February 1992. 
52 Di Mauro v. Italy, 28 July 1999. 
53 25 March 1999. 
54 
25 September 1997. 
55 28 July 1999. 
56 A 241-A. 
57 
Tekin v. Turkey, Rec. 1998-IV, No. 7. 
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Even allowing for the very different indexes of econom­
ic well-being between various Convention states which ob­
viously have to be factored into the equation, the discrep­
ancies between some awards appear unconvincing. Aydin v. 
Turkey54 and Selmouni v. France55 both related to particu­
larly repulsive cases of torture during police detention, which, 
in Mrs Aydin's case included rape. The Court awarded Sel­
mouni almost double the amount granted to Mrs Aydin, al­
though the Court expressly emphasized that it took into ac­
count the extraordinarily terrifying ordeal Mrs Aydin had to 
go through. 
But then this disturbing inconsistency appears even be­
tween two French cases. In Tomasi v. France, the issue in­
cluded torture and the length of detention on remand and trial, 
and the award was 700,000 FF.56 In Selmouni the award was
substantially less: 500,000 FF. In a way Mrs Aydin was par­
ticularly lucky. In another case in which the Court found tor­
ture, only 100,000 FF were awarded.57
Subtly linked with the determination of moral damages 
is the question of what weight, if any, is to be given to the 
racial or ethnic background of the complaint. As far as I am 
aware, the Court has never acknowledged the existence of 
particular situations of ethnicity, like that of the Kurdish peo­
ple in Turkey, nor has it ever declared that the several vio­
lations of fundamental rights the Kurds have been found to 
be victims of, have anything to do with their Kurdish origin. 
All suggestions that they are treated differently from other 
Turkish citizens because of a different ethnic origin, have al­
ways been disregarded by the Court. Not a single application 
by Kurdish applicants based on discrimination arising from 
their different ethnic origin, has ever been entertained by the 
Court. Their misfortunes and misadventures are always, un­
realistically in my view, attributed to other reasons or to no 
reason at all. 
The same could be said about gypsies, with the complex 
uniqueness of their life-style which should call for solutions 
diverse from other non-nomad populations. Their applica­
tions have, so far, received no sympathy at all from the Court. 
Not one of their actions claiming intrusive violations of the 
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state into their way of life, into their cultural imperatives, has 
been successful. For the Court it is as if gypsy problems do 
not call for different solutions. The Court found against gyp­
sies who had parked their caravans in unauthorized sites, 
even when the authorities had failed in the duty imposed on 
them by law to provide legal camping sites for gypsies. 
In a recent revolutionary decision, the Court defined im­
permissible discrimination not only in the classical sense of 
treating equals unequally. It went one fearless step further: 
impermissible discrimination is also treating unequals equal­
ly. The Court said: 'The right not to be discriminated against 
.. . is also violated when states, without an objective and rea­
sonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose 
situations are significantly different' .58 Unfortunately this 
brave new world found little echo in gypsy scenarios. Here 
national authorities persist in treating in a similar manner peo­
ples (like gypsies) who have intrinsically different needs and 
features, as if they were sedentary Europeans races with tra­
ditional cultures. 
One particular country in the southern area has been ex­
emplary - and rightly in my view - penalized by the Court 
for repeated violations of the same fundamental right. Our 
good neighbour Italy has an evident problem of court delays 
in civil cases, fortunately unknown in Malta. The Court has 
recently expressly established that the Italian breach is so 
widespread, long-standing and intractable that, what in sim­
ilar circumstances in other Convention states would be an 
individual violation, in Italian cases amounts to 'an admin­
istrative practice' .59 Although you will not, I believe, find it 
expressly stated in any judgement, it is easily noticeable that 
moral damages for delays in civil proceedings are markedly 
higher against Italy than other awards in carbon-copy cases 
against other Convention states. 'Perhaps' commented a jurist, 
'larger awards are deemed necessary [against Italy] to exert 
pressure for change' .flJ And that is certainly one of the func­
tions of the Court, when an abusive system of conduct be­
comes so widespread as to be formally recognized as 'an ad­
ministrative practice'. 
Less explainable is the fact that the Court, though express­
ly requested to, has failed to acknowledge the existence of 
an 'administrative practice' in the far more serious cases of 
violations of the right to life and the prohibition of torture in 
states in which a consistent sequence of such violations have 
been registered. The Court has also expressly refused, though 
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requested, to award punitive damages for particularly heinous 
violations by states which have repeatedly been found to be 
relapsers in the same infringements. At best, in the exemplary 
case of Askoy v. Turkey, in which the applicant was killed by 
security forces after he had lodged his complaint in Strasburg, 
the Court stated that in view of the extremely serious viola­
tions of the Convention suffered by Mr Ziki Askoy and the 
anxiety and distress that these undoubtedly caused to his fa­
ther (who continued with the application after his son's death), 
'the Court has decided to award the full amounts of compen­
sation sought as regards pecuniary and non-pecuniary dam­
ages' .61 For the Court to award a damage claim in its fullness,
does not happen often .. 
It is equally difficult to reconcile the extent of the award 
of moral damages for pain and suffering in another case in 
which the applicant's son had wantonly been killed by the 
security forces of the state, with the case of Halford v. UK 
in which the applicant's phone had been tapped by the police. 
In the latter case the Court felt bound to place on record that 
there was no evidence that the stress the applicant suffered from 
was directly attributable to the interception of her calls, rather 
than to her other conflicts with the Merseyside police. All the 
same the Court awarded her £10,000 for moral damages.62 The 
parents of the young man murdered cold-bloodedly by the 
security police got slightly less.63
Pecuniary Loss 
In general the liquidation of pecuniary loss suffered by the 
victim of a human rights violation does not raise as many 
difficulties as that of moral damages. Proved lucrum cessans 
and damnum emergens constitute the basis of that head of 
compensation. Thus the case-law of the Court has taken into 
account medical expenses, loss of pension rights, reimburse­
ment of fines paid, loss of past and future earnings, payment 
of the value of unlawfully expropriated effects, loss of inter­
ests, loss due to inflation etc. 
But a few problems do occasionally arise, as, for exam­
ple, the just valuation of property, the causal link between the 
violation and the damages, loss of opportunities and the quan­
tum of proof required to establish real damages. 
An early classic was the case of Sporrong and Lonroth 
v. Sweden64 which concerned an official order that froze build­
ing permits on the applicants' property and was left in force
for a considerably long time. The applicant submitted one
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way of calculating the losses, the respondent state a radical­
ly different one. The Court rejected both methods and made 
an assessment on an equitable basis, the workings of which 
were not disclosed. That propelled the Court right away into 
the grey areas of unfettered discretion. It must be recognized 
that the Court has neither the structures in place, nor the ex­
pertise, to determine complex matters of valuation of proper­
ty, or of dealing with expert evidence. The Court had intend­
ed to neutralize this weakness in property compensation pro­
ceedings, by appointing its own expert valuers. The results, 
however, have hardly been any more encouraging. In a Greek 
case, as the fees due to the experts were proportional to the 
amount they assessed, the respondent government accused 
the experts of being 'scandalously favourable' to the appli­
cants in their valuation.65 
A complex issue from the legal standpoint relates to what 
Strasburg case-law refers to as 'speculative losses'. The Court, 
often, refuses to make an award of pecuniary losses where 
there is some uncertainty whether the applicant would all the 
same have suffered the loss if the violation had not occurred. 
In some cases, mostly related to illegal detention and to the 
breach of the fair hearing guarantees in civil and criminal pro­
ceedings, the Court often dismisses the claim with the formu­
la that it is 'unwilling to speculate' what the outcome of the do­
mestic court proceedings would have been had the breach not 
occurred, and denies damages, placing the onus of proof on the 
applicant and resorting to the strictest of causation tests. 
This failure to award any damages, in my view, brings 
about an extremely serious situation. Had the result of the find­
ing of a breach of the fair hearing guarantees automatically re­
sulted in the re-opening of the vitiated domestic proceedings, 
then one could perhaps understand this reluctance to grant 
compensation. But, as it is, the Court only finds that the appli­
cant has not received a fair hearing, and stops there. He neither 
gets a re-hearing from the Strasburg Court ( which is not a court 
of appeal), nor is his case reopened in the domestic court. Nor 
is he awarded any compensation. In effect, he is told he is a 
victim, that he did not receive a fair hearing, and that this is the 
end of the matter. One then asks what the scope of the Stras­
burg proceedings is, if they neither redress in any manner the 
violation by procuring a rehearing of the tainted proceedings, 
nor by ordering any form of compensation. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that in some other 
cases, however, when the outcome of the domestic proceedings 
would have been equally uncertain, the Court that was unwill­
ing to speculate on the outcome, equally awarded damages, 
but under the heading of 'loss of opportunities' . This trend 
is notable in some UK cases, though not exclusively so.66
The report by the English and Scottish Law Commission 
highlights the state of uncertainty when no compensation is 
granted because of the Court's unwillingness to speculate, 
and when compensation is granted as 'loss of opportunities': 
'There are numerous cases falling on either side of the line. 
It is impossible to reconcile these decisions . .. One can only 
guess that in some cases the Court feels sympathy towards 
certain applicants based on particular circumstances, and will 
go out of its way to award damages, despite [the absence of] 
the usual requirement of a clear causal link'.(§ 3.66, 3.69) 
I would certainly agree 'that it is impossible to reconcile 
these decisions', but would suggest that it is possible to come 
to an equitable conclusion by reconciling the two extremes. 
In my view, when a causal link between the violation and the 
loss suffered has not been sufficiently established, it would 
be inconsequential to award material damages. However, as 
it is to be presumed that the applicant has suffered a sense 
of frustration, anxiety, stress and dismay through the unlaw­
ful detention or through his participation in unfair court pro­
ceedings, then, if the breach can be considered to have had an 
impact on the applicant, compensation for that pain and suf­
fering, correlative in amount the matter at stake, ought to be 
ordered under the head of non-pecuniary or moral damages. 
A final set of observations concerning material damages. 
The Court does not seem to have been too consistent with 
its response to the failure of the applicant or his lawyers to 
provide detailed proof of the material loss suffered. The Rules 
of Court specify that it is the duty of the applicant to satisfy 
the Court with itemized particulars of all the claims, otherwise 
the Court may dismiss the claim (Rule 60 §2). 
However, the Court's reaction to a failure by the applicant 
to produce this justification of material damages has ranged 
from the excessively tolerant to the downright draconian. 
When an applicant fails to quantify his material damages, the 
Court has at least four options open to it: it may, at any stage 
of the proceedings before the finding of a violation, request 
him or her to furnish any information it deems lacking (Rule 
60 §3). It may, in the judgement finding a violation, declare 
that the issue of just satisfaction is not yet ready for determi­
nation and invite the parties to substantiate their claims. Third­
ly, it may, in the absence of precise data in the case-file, pro­
ceed to liquidate the amount of pecuniary damages, using its 
discretionary powers 'on an equitable basis' .67 Or, fourthly,
it may dismiss the case outright. 
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I have in mind some disturbing cases, like that of a young 
victim who was killed during police detention, employed at the 
time of his death and the breadwinner of the household. His 
family's lawyers failed to come up with evidence of what his 
earnings had been. The Court dismissed any claim for mate­
rial loss suffered by his survivors, and awarded zero pecuniary 
compensation.68 It would have been so easy for the Court to
asses the material damages suffered, basing itself on the min­
imum wage current in the country at that time. 
This has repeatedly occurred in Turkish applications. In the 
Gerger case, the applicant had been convicted and had spent 
one year and nine months in prison in violation of the Conven­
tion; he had also actually paid a fine imposed on him, equally 
in violation of the Convention. The Court established that his 
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rights had been infringed, but did not award him any compen­
sation for material damages, as it considered he had failed to 
supply evidence in support of his claims for loss.69 In the Gulec
case, which concerned the unlawful killing of the applicant's 
son who was a high school student and worked after school, the 
Court equally refused any compensation for material dam­
ages, as these had not been proved.
70 
It is in the area of just satisfaction that the judgements of 
the Court can best exercise that institution's three major func­
tions: that of reinstating the victim of the violation, that of cen­
suring the culprit state, and that of discharging its pedagog­
ical responsibilities. These are core obligations that the Court 
mostly, but not invariably, manages to fulfil. 
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